



L.O. Aranye Fradenburg & Eileen A. Joy
To Diverge, Rather than to Undo1
Probably most of us would agree that, however expert we might 
become in this or that specialty, we are not richly educated until 
we have experience of a wide range of disciplines and method-
ologies — a range that includes critique and creativity, analysis 
and immersion, learning and unlearning. To our sorrow, this 
conception of education is rapidly losing favor with the citizen-
ry. There are, of course, pushbacks. San Francisco took to the 
courts to defend the nature of its City College’s (CCSF) course 
offerings from the so-called “student success” movement, which 
preaches efficiency and “progress to the degree.” The Accredit-
ing Commission for Community and Junior Colleges (a private 
concern) has tried to shut City College down, and the SF Dis-
trict Attorney has successfully sued to protect it (City Attorney 
of San Francisco, 2016). Prior to the attack by the ACCJC, CCSF 
1 Our “duologue” alternates between us, first Aranye, then Eileen, and so on, 




actually maintained graduation rates better than those of most 
community colleges in the country; the real target of the Ac-
creditation Commission appears to have been the wide range 
of services CCSF provides for San Franciscans that do not target 
progress-to-the-degree as such, like the Queer Resource Center, 
the Women’s Resource Center and Library, English classes for 
recent immigrants, parenting classes for new parents, technical 
and clerical training, music, painting, and sound engineering. 
Colleges like CCSF are points of crossover between the academy 
and the rest of the world. They treat culture shock, give the el-
derly new leases on life, and resist the ongoing enserfment of 
the citizenry and those who aspire to it. The “student success” 
movement means to impoverish sentience, not to enrich it; it’s a 
Thatcherite attempt to discipline and punish, and capitalists love 
it. But why do so many other people fall for it?
Most students and parents hate teachers, at least some of 
the time, for subjecting said students to apparently impersonal 
standards. If we give a student the grade we think they really 
deserve, or if we make them sit for one exam after another, or if 
we don’t even let them into college, then why should we escape 
external assessment and accountability? If academics play, ex-
periment, muck about with things and other people’s money (as 
opposed to the capitalists who spend many thousand dollars of 
other people’s money on umbrella stands), then we are Žižekian 
thieves of enjoyment, who wreak havoc in what Lacan called 
“the dollar zone,” ruled by the fantasy of equivalence between 
and among persons, objects, and symbols. Academic knowledge 
is edgy, hard to evaluate, and takes a long time to metabolize. 
Hence, while our new understandings of neuroplasticity and 
neuronal connectivity make the argument for the value of liberal 
arts learning, they remain “quiet” in educational policy debates. 
Arguably, however, the complexification and integration — not 
homogenization — of brain functions is the goal of education. 
Educational theorist Wolf Singer strongly emphasizes the 
roles of connectivity and integration in adult learning: “the only 
major change that nervous systems have undergone during 
evolution is a dramatic increase in complexity” — that is to say, 
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not only a “massive” increase in the number of nerve cells but 
also a stunning increase in connections, including “numerous 
long-range connections” linking “nerve cells that are distributed 
across remote areas of the brain” (2008, 99). Damasio similarly 
believes that the experience of selfhood depends on connections 
between the “primitive” brainstem and the new orbitofrontal re-
gions of the brain (2010, 192–193, 213, 243), and Edelman argues 
for the role of the basal ganglia in the creation of the redundancy 
loops that play such an important role in neuroplasticity (2004, 
24). A lot that we think is new, or modern, or postmodern, de-
rives from the oldest parts of the triune brain, which participate 
actively in the “developmental processes in which selection of 
cortical circuits depends on experience,” such that, as Singer 
puts it, “frequently-occurring correlations in the outer world 
can be translated into the architecture of connections” (2008, 
103). Our environments and histories, in other words, are actu-
ally built into the (always changing) functional architecture of 
our brains. Singer also notes that arousal and attention are re-
quired to induce “lasting changes in the circuitry” of the brain; 
“rewards,” hence pleasure, or lack thereof, will be relevant here, 
as also “behavioral significance,” especially since genetic scripts 
derive from past experience (2008, 105). 
Educational researcher Tracy Tokuhama-Espinosa invokes 
a number of these modulatory and other epigenetic factors in 
her survey of “major brain functions as they relate to human 
survival and life skills” — skills that are needed to survive both 
in academic settings and “social situations.” Her list of these 
major brain functions includes: 1. Affect, empathy, motivation; 
2. Executive, decision-making functions; 3. Facial recognition 
and interpretation; 4. Memory; 5. Attention; 6. Social cogni-
tion; 7. Spatial management; 8. Temporal management (2011, 
143). These are the same functions that Singer regards as cru-
cial to epigenetic connectivity; they forge the ecological links 
between brain architecture and worldly experience at stake in 
both surviving and thriving. As I argue in Staying Alive (2013), 
it’s the particular brief of the arts and humanities to enhance the 
skills on which thriving and surviving depend. We cannot sat-
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isfy a “need,” assuming we could identify one in the first place, 
without also experiencing affects and sensations (for example, 
pleasure, triumph, disgust, shame). So the interconnections of 
these functions are crucial — for example, the role of affect in 
decision-making, in focusing attention, and in the formation 
of memories. Unsurprisingly (as Tokuhama notes), nonverbal 
forms of communication, like facial expressions and tones of 
voice, are crucial to effective pedagogy and to the mastery of the 
abstract symbolism too often thought of as their opposite. These 
prosodic and performative elements are at work in the earliest 
modes of intersubjectivity, which take place in the context of 
the attachment process. Indeed, the profound relationality of 
learning is driven by the affective power of attachment. The psy-
choanalyst Wilfrid Bion (1959) emphasizes the intersubjectivity 
of the work of “linking” and “thinking,” whereby the attach-
ment figure helps the baby to process chaotic feelings and dread 
by naming them and connecting them to other experiences. 
“[T]he brain is a social organ that thrives on interaction with 
others,” as Tokuhama-Espinosa puts it (2011, 166). Learning 
from other minds is impossible without theory of mind; learn-
ing depends on our capacity to understand that other minds 
are like our own, but also distinct from our own. But theory 
of mind in turn is acquired in the context of the sensory, affec-
tive and aesthetic dimensions of attachment. It is thus a kind of 
environmental theory, insofar as our awareness of different and 
non-mindedness depends also on our understanding of what 
our minds are like.
Tokuhama-Espinosa’s suggestion of a link between emotion-
al intelligence and metacognitive capacities (such as reflection) 
makes perfect sense in the context of attachment behavior in 
general and “active quiet” in particular. (“Active quiet” refers to 
the periods of play, e.g., peekaboo, engaged in by young babies 
and their caregivers, believed to be a chief means of intersub-
jective learning; these periods are punctuated by restful periods 
of withdrawal of attention.) Paul Howard Jones, in Introducing 
Neuroeducational Research, also stresses the counter-intuitive 
importance of metacognitive factors in training teachers of 
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drama. Analysis is not inimical to creativity, he argues; instead, 
they are mutually supportive brain functions (2010, 138–63). 
The focused attention and working memory needed for analysis 
are impossible without affect; associative creativity is rapid and 
relatively uncensored brain connectivity, as Nancy Andreasen 
(2006) has argued. Her research suggests that the corpus cal-
losum, the thicket of connective fibers linking the right to the 
left hemisphere of the brain, is specially aroused during times 
of creativity. Jones’s experiments with drama-teacher trainees 
also emphasize the interactions between right- and left-brain 
activity (2010, 160). Both hemispheres of the brain are needed 
for linguistic processing. The left side specializes in syntax and 
logic, while the right side specializes in the emotional and social 
significance of utterances. But if the right brain is damaged, the 
result is not speech that sounds affectless, but rather non-sense, 
so important are emotional and social contexts in the construc-
tion of syntax and logic. And hence the importance of the lib-
eral arts. Scientific method relies on quantitative analysis and 
controlled conditions; humanistic methods address real-time 
performance, rhetoric, persuasion, social and emotional expres-
sivity and intelligence, the capacity to improvise. But attention 
and memory, affect and the senses, are vital to both, and so is re-
lationality. My answer to Malabou’s well-known question “What 
Should We Do with Our Brain?” is therefore “enrich it.” The fact 
is that many basic brain functions must work together to enable 
even the narrowest of specializations — scientific, mathematical, 
musical, or otherwise.
How does the concept of “unlearning” illuminate, or ques-
tion, the neuronal complexity now axiomatic in the new sci-
ence of the brain? Is there, for example, a “before” to “unlearn-
ing,” or even an un to unlearning? To the extent that the term 
“unlearning” presupposes a learning that needs to be undone 
before new learning can take place, it conjures a linearity that 
is not altogether helpful. Here is an example from Descartes: 
“The chief cause of our errors,” he wrote, “are the prejudices of 
our childhood. […] I must seriously address myself to the gen-
eral upheaval of all my former opinions” ([1641] 1955, 23). Here 
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is another example, this time from the discourse of organiza-
tional psychology: “[L]earning often cannot occur until after 
there has been unlearning. Unlearning is a process that shows 
people they should no longer rely on their current beliefs and 
methods. Because current beliefs and methods shape percep-
tions, they blind people to some potential interpretations of 
evidence […] ‘[People] […] hold onto their theories until […] 
failures […] convince them to accept new paradigms’” (Kuhn 
1962, cited in Petroski 1992, 180–81; see also Starbuck). Similar 
narrative elements are at work in the story told by many devel-
opmental and psychoanalytic theorists about how our relational 
expectations — including patterns of anticipation, prepared-
ness, anxiety, hope, and desire — resist modification, producing 
“entrenchment,” or, in the analytic situation, transference. Time 
lags because the past lives on in us; nothing is altogether super-
seded. But contemporary fields of knowledge-making are also 
creating more complex narratives. Not all of us who are psycho-
analysts expect our patients to uproot their relational expecta-
tions altogether before new ones can begin to form. For that 
matter, Freud himself characterized all new relationships, in-
cluding analytic ones, as “new editions,” “facsimiles” of old ones. 
The discourse of unlearning seems on the other hand to polarize 
the old and the new, where the old simply resists the new, rather 
than providing opportunities for its creation. 
Sameness is not a popular goal these days, and for very good 
reasons, when it supports the fantasy of eradicating difference. 
But as so much queer theory has noted, both difference and 
sameness are relative to larger networks of conceptualization 
and evaluation. Few things are completely the same or com-
pletely different from other things, partly because sameness and 
difference are in the end relativized abstractions we use to rec-
ognize and modify patterns. (“Sameness” is of course not the 
same thing as a “link” or “linking,” but the latter draws on the 
former.) Abstractions are always cathected, or not, if they have 
cognitive significance. If the desire for sameness is or can be 
part of us, is there something in sameness for us? Freud precedes 
his account of the “simplest organism” in Beyond the Pleasure 
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Principle with the paradoxical claim that staying the same is the 
goal of all becoming; we change because of our wish for repose, 
and ultimately, for inanimacy. The “external disturbing and di-
verting influences” responsible for “the phenomena of organic 
development” elicit responses that bring about change in the 
organism, but said responses “are merely seeking to reach an 
ancient goal by paths alike old and new” (1955, 37–38).2 By at-
tributing the dynamism of organic development exclusively to 
the impingements of the external environment on the organism, 
Freud maintains a distinction between the creature’s desire and 
its ecology that is no longer tenable. But he at least insists that 
the development of organisms can only be understood in the 
context of “the history of the earth we live in and of its relation 
to the sun” (1955, 38). He invites us, further, to suppose “that all 
the organic instincts are conservative, are acquired historically 
and tend towards the restoration of an earlier state of things” 
(1955, 49). It is a paradox worth considering that the drives have 
a history partly because they “tend towards the restoration of an 
earlier state of things.” Because the organic instincts are acquired 
historically, through long ages of experience and reality-testing, 
and because they have been such a long time in becoming, the 
past is built into them, and they have an allegiance to it. This 
is a narrative that foregrounds intimacies between sameness 
and difference, conservation, and exploration. We need, at least, 
some such story “to reckon with the organism’s puzzling deter-
mination (so hard to fit into any context) to maintain its own 
existence in the face of every obstacle”: the organism insists on 
following “its own path to death,” and warding off “any possible 
ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which 
are immanent in the organism itself ” (Freud 1955, 37).
Here Freud is not so very far from Francisco Varela’s use of 
the term autopoiesis to refer to the creature’s constant remak-
2 Regrettably, Freud assumes that the “the elementary living entity would 
from its very beginning have had no wish to change; if conditions remained 
the same, it would do no more than constantly repeat the same course of 
life” (1955, 38). Studies of animal innovation do not confirm this assumption 
about the wishes of living entities. In a way, neither does Freud himself.
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ing of itself in accordance with its particular potentialities, af-
fordances, and provisions. Varela conceives of autopoiesis as 
always highly interactive with the organism’s environment; it is 
a systems term, not a term that indicates individual autonomy: 
An autopoietic machine [e.g., a cell], is […] organized […] 
as a network of processes of production […] of components 
[…] [which], […] through their interactions and transfor-
mations[,] continuously regenerate […] the network of pro-
cesses […] that produced them; and […] constitute [the ma-
chine] […] as a concrete unity in space […]. (Maturana and 
Varela 1972, 78)
Each cell participates in a lavish network of biochemical con-
nections in order to regenerate itself as “a concrete unity in 
space.” Autopoiesis resists, not aggregation nor multiplicity, but 
assimilation to other ways of being alive. What we now know of 
uterine life is that as soon as we have ears to hear, we hear all the 
world around us. But we are also born with already-acquired 
preferences — for the music, the stories, the tastes, and smells 
of our prenatal experience. Becoming, yes; but becoming is not 
beyond attachment. 
So what is the point of proposing that a linear process must 
take place — “learning often cannot occur until after” (my em-
phasis) — rather than positing that experimentation and its 
failures are simply part of all “learning” activities (changing, 
transforming, plasticizing, playing)? For that matter, why would 
we not posit that experimentation is part of all living process? 
Certainly we can think about habits, ideology, expertise, and the 
like as “entrenched” materially by the forming of strongly linked 
neural pathways that then guide us non-consciously. But what 
does it avail us to think of the process of learning anew as the 
equivalent of blowing up an old building to make way for a new 
one? Might it not be possible, that is, to diverge, to re-contextual-
ize, instead of to undo? To create new, alternative pathways that 
intersect with old neuronal patterns and thus make creative use 
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of them in the project of living? Is a more holistic thinking pos-
sible about the nature of sentient responsiveness?
Particularly if we keep in mind the role of affect in the for-
mation of memories, the question of why we cling or adhere to 
“tradition” is a matter of affective investments, of cathexis and 
de-cathexis. It is not clear to me that we can “unlearn” without 
undergoing mourning. The “giving up” of the old, of “home,” 
in order to make way for the new is one of our most ancient 
and contemporary calls to sacrifice. Freud changed course on 
this point, acknowledging in a 1929 letter to Ludwig Binswanger 
that the substitution of an old object for a new one was not an 
adequate conceptualization since mourning is never really over:
[a]lthough we know that after […] a loss the acute state of 
mourning will subside, we also know we shall remain incon-
solable and will never find a substitute. No matter what may 
fill the gap, even if it be filled completely, it nevertheless re-
mains something else. And actually this is how it should be. 
It is the only way of perpetuating that love which we do not 
want to relinquish. (1961, 386) 
Studies of creativity show us over and over again that new learn-
ing depends on old knowledge. Arguably, the “Renaissance” 
could not have happened without the critical mechanisms of 
medieval skepticism, dissent, and iconoclasm. Studies of social 
learning make similar claims: if the elders in a tribe are wiped 
out prematurely, the result is not the opportunity to innovate 
but rather irreparable damage to the tribe’s capacity for mak-
ing and responsiveness. In behavioral ethology, “neophobia” 
and “neophilia” are not necessarily opposites but more typically 
interactive elements in always-already ongoing and mutually 
constitutive vital processes of responsiveness. Even Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) argue for the radical potential of “archaisms” in 
history, just as Jane Bennett (2001) has claimed that premodern 
materialist understandings of sympathetic bonds and antipa-
thetic lines of flight might inspire “new” respect for the vitality 
of all things. 
164
Pedagogics of Unlearning
How, then, should we think about attachment in the age 
of complexity theory? “Emergence” seems to resolve so many 
problems and antinomies. A new open system does not so much 
reject as reboot on a level of greater complexity the elements of 
previous systems. Does that mean we can focus on contempo-
raneity without worrying about the past? It’s still with us, so if 
we work on “us,” we’re also working on it? And maybe its arti-
facts, its DNA, can emerge again, chock-full of new significances 
and material effects that nonetheless could not be were it not 
for the old ones? We have certainly made arguments like this. 
“Scale” offers similar opportunities: now we can think about 
decades, epochs, historical periods, the entire Anthropocene 
and beyond, as equally legitimate ways of shaping time in the 
pursuit of certain questions; indeed we can see each “period” 
as a complex network of different time scales. Foucauldian dis-
continuism and Foucauldian genealogy perhaps turn out to be 
the same thing, or complementary (see Fradenburg 2009). The 
tempting quality of these formulations gives us all the more rea-
son to raise the question of the value of what we learn relative to 
the value of what we feel (not that these are radically distinct). 
Do our new-ish ways of thinking ask us to sacrifice the experi-
ence of attachment, love, bonding, relationality, intersubjectiv-
ity, trans-subjectivity? Because all of these involve bonds that do 
not easily let go. The networks of material relationships always 
under construction that affect our circumstances (whether at 
unimaginable distances of time and space or not) are still rela-
tionships that have implications for all affective experience. If 
the sympathies and antipathies that build molecules are an in-
stance of the tendencies to aggregation, symbiosis, and autopoi-
esis characteristic of living process (see, for example, Margulis 
1998), on what basis do we assume that our reluctance to change 
shape is simply an effect of the limitations of subjectivity? What 
exactly does it avail us to turn irreversible change into higher 
levels of complexity? What do we lose when we lose lack? In 
current environmental theory, the soothing, apparently opti-
mistic aspects of the holistic concept of “ecology” (those that 
tempt us to think everything will adjust somehow — Radioactive 
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Wolves style of consolation3) are cut across by the real tear in the 
fabric of the Real promised by the current explosion of methane 
gas from the melting permafrost of the Arctic circle. Not just the 
polar bears are headed for the slaughterhouse. 
Chaos and complexity theory and their offshoots — net-
works, meshworks, connectivity — dissolve the irreversibility of 
particular events and actions when and if inspired by melan-
choly, when “[w]hat should be a thought […] becomes a bad 
object, indistinguishable from a thing-in-itself, fit only for evac-
uation” (Bion 1962, 306–307). It is not a good idea to void and 
avoid lack and discontinuity as intolerable thought-objects, any 
more than it is to void and avoid continuity and resurgence. The 
refusal to link and thus think is not the same thing as seeing 
that a link has been broken. The obsessional defense of undoing, 
like Radioactive Wolves, undoes the act(s) of destructivity — our 
own — which we imagine, not incorrectly, to be the reason for 
our expulsion from paradise. But if we are expelled together, 
and there is no “third,” if the couple or coupling have already 
absorbed the “outside” ideas that disturbed the equilibrium of 
the imaginary, if the damage can be undone one way or another, 
will they, and we, be all right? Who knows? Obsessional doubt 
also keeps us in the mire of a refusal of attachment, of decision, 
since, as Sodre puts it of one of his analysands, “any decision 
represented a loss, and […] this loss was unbearable” (1994, 
384). Does unlearning have anything in common with undoing? 
Or is it an antidote of sorts? Of one thing I am sure: changing 
people’s minds requires empathetic exploration of their attach-
ments to prior viewpoints. As Martin Jordan writes,
3 Radiocative Wolves is a PBS Nature documentary, released in 2011, that ex-
plores how, in the ensuing 25 years after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 
“forests, marshes, fields and rivers reclaimed the land, reversing the effects 
of hundreds of years of human development,” and how this “dead zone” has 
become “a kind of post-nuclear Eden, populated by beaver and bison, horses 




The radical nature of ecology means that everything is in-
terconnected, and it is the job of ecopsychotherapy to help 
humans negotiate the complex and interdependent present, 
not by romanticizing the perfect ecological past nor predict-
ing some future ecological catastrophe, but by bearing to stay 
with the temporal spaces of the complex present. (2012, 145)
I am in complete agreement with the commitment to negoti-
ating “the complex and interdependent present,” but not with 
“bearing to stay […] in the […] present.” Becoming creates but 
does not “stay” in spatialized temporalities. To give up yearning, 
to give up prophecy: why should we give up love, why should 
we give up fear? The language of “some future ecological catas-
trophe” dismisses the Real that now screens itself in the form of 
gigantic methane-releasing sinkholes. Complexity and extrem-
ity are not mutually exclusive.
The University-to-Come
Sinkholes are a drag, literally. Because they pull the earth out 
from under your feet and reveal a fact of worldy existence we 
don’t always like to confront: there is no such thing as solid 
ground, no place you can return to that hasn’t changed, or 
decomposed, or even been eradicated. At the same time, one 
doesn’t easily slip the bonds of history, no matter how change-
able that history might be. If current neuroscientific research 
is right, there is such a thing as “transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance” (Dias and Ressler 2014), and that means I am car-
rying around my grandfather’s fears and anxieties, maybe even 
his dreams. In other words, things and situations in the environ-
ment that affected my relatives may still be affecting me — be-
haviorally, neuro-anatomically, and epigenetically. We’ll agree, 
then, that there is no escaping tradition or the past, and likewise, 
hankering after “the new” (or the “never was”) has its decidedly 
dark side — just think of the Taliban demolishing Buddhist stat-
ues in Afghanistan in 2001 as a way to reset the historical clock 
to Year Zero (Rashid 2001). You can’t accomplish these follies 
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without a lot of violence and murder — psychic, bodily, struc-
turally, and otherwise. As one of my favorite novelists Lucy Co-
rin has said, “When apocalyptic thinking is internal, it’s rich and 
beautiful.” But “enact [apocalyptic thinking] in real time with 
real people, and it’s just about as fucked up as you can get” — be-
cause “of history, because there is no new time” (quoted in 
Vogrin 2010, 67; my emphasis). Nevertheless, an unthinking 
embrace of tradition for tradition’s sake is equally dangerous, 
and novelty is important, if only to help us unsettle some of our 
overly-habituated modes of thought and practice. We’ll admit, 
then, that we can’t escape history and that Epicurus’s laminar 
void, through which atomic particles once “rained,” and then, 
through various small “swerves” (Luctretius’s clinamen) created 
our world, is no longer possible (at least, not from the stand-
point of the universe being empty and unformed). At the same 
time, we need to somehow be able to cultivate a certain radical 
contingency in order to engender material encounters that can’t 
be predicted in advance, and out of which alternative life and art 
practices become more possible. The very problem of politics, 
in my opinion, is precisely its entrenchment in mentalities and 
histories and procedures that can’t be, or aren’t allowed to be, 
unthought nor abandoned (on this point, see Althusser 2006). 
But we can’t reboot democracy, either, by hitting the delete key 
and just “starting over.” 
I honestly worry less about the destructive entrenchment 
of bad “un-novel” and acquiescent politics and more about the 
ways in which transnational, hyper-runaway capital makes even 
political regimes ultimately inconsequential relative to “how 
things might turn out” (with respect to climate change, sectar-
ian wars, the automation of human labor, the end of the public 
research university as we have known it, global poverty and the 
scarcity of vital resources such as clean water, environmental 
pollution and pandemics, etc.). And with Aranye, I neither want 
to avoid lack and discontinuity nor continuity and resurgence. 
Nor do I want to despair, although, as Robin Mackay and Ar-




Despair seems to be the dominant sentiment of the contem-
porary Left, whose crisis perversely mimics its foe, consoling 
itself either with the minor pleasures of shrill denunciation, 
mediatised protest and ludic disruptions, or with the scarcely 
credible notion that maintaining a grim “critical” vigilance 
on the total subsumption of human life under capital, from 
the safehouse of theory, or from within contemporary art’s 
self-congratulatory fog of “indeterminacy,” constitutes resis-
tance. (2014, 5)
I also do not believe, strictly speaking, that there is any longer 
(nor has there ever been) an Outside to depart to, some other 
ground on which entirely new structures could be built apart 
from toxic hyper-capitalist relations, although I think about be-
trayal a lot, and about the importance of irresponsibility, with 
regard to both tradition and innovation, and also with regard 
to plotting a certain course that supposedly knits both togeth-
er into the form of a so-called ethical or “good” life. As Sara 
Ahmed has put it, “For a life to count as a good life […] it must 
return the debt of its life by taking on the direction promised as 
a social good, which means imagining one’s futurity in terms of 
reaching certain points along a life course. A queer life might 
be one that fails to make such gestures of return” (2006, 21). We 
can’t stop looking back, or forward, but we might refuse to take 
on certain inheritances, no matter from which direction they’re 
arriving — the past, with its “traditions,” and the future, with its 
supposedly inevitable neoliberal accelerationism and resulting 
technological singularities (see Williams and Srnicek 2013). 
I’m interested, then, in gestures of refusal, of non-compliance, 
of (again) betrayal, and in thinking about the ways in which the 
present might be more of a creatively productive fugitive zone, 
where time forks and bends everywhere but the past and future, 
and where we might practice the arts of divergent, tapestried 
becomings. As Aranye writes in “(Dis)continuity: A History of 
Dreaming,” “Somehow, the unpredictable depends on what it su-
persedes. We cannot bypass having a past,” and yet, at the same 
time, “the work is to keep moving” (Fradenburg 2009, 93, 109). 
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So, yes, let us not necessarily undo, nor blow up, what we have 
learned thus far, but let us definitely diverge. Although, contra 
Aranye, I want to put in a good word for occasionally “bearing 
to stay” where we might happen to be at any given moment, 
even if it’s the most fucked-up place imaginable — not as a refus-
al of movement or change or productively divergent becomings, 
but as a form of resistance to the idea that the only good move-
ment is forward, or somewhere else other than here, wherever 
that may be. Maybe there are times when we should embrace 
being stuck in personal incapacities and what might be called 
inoperative communities4 of the exhausted, of institutionalized 
(and even post-institutionalized) invalids, where we might al-
low ourselves to be “at an impasse,” while also cultivating new 
arts of care and convalescence, rest and indolence, choosing not 
to perform versus learning how to perform at ever more high 
and supposedly calculable levels. I borrow these notions from 
Jan Verwoert, who also asks us to consider what it might mean 
to embrace an “existential exuberance,” which would be
a way to perform without any mandate or legitimation, in re-
sponse to the desires and dreams of other people, but without 
the aim or pretense of merely fulfilling an existing demand. 
It is always a way of giving too much of what is not presently 
requested. It is a way of giving what you do not have to oth-
ers who may not want it. It is a way of transcending your ca-
pacities by embracing your incapacities and therefore a way 
to interrupt the brute assertiveness of the I Can through the 
performance of an I Can’t performed in the key of I Can. It’s 
a way of insisting that, even if we can’t get it now, we can get 
it, in some other way at some other point in time. (2007, 94)
4 I borrow the term “inoperative community” from Jean-Luc Nancy who 
writes that community is “given to us […] well in advance of all our projects, 
desires, and undertakings,” and further, that, at bottom, community is resis-
tance itself, especially resistance to immanence (1991, 35). The essence of a 
community we could really get behind (and that would not harden into fas-
cism) is its own “incessant incompletion” and the way it ceaselessly “exposes 
community at its limit” (1991, 38; Nancy’s emphasis).
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That sounds like a good definition of teaching to me as well, 
although I myself have stopped teaching — have stopped being 
a “professor” — partly because the university, increasingly, feels 
less and less like an hospitable place in which to think, write, 
and share ideas. It doesn’t feel like the right place any more to 
enact what Lauren Berlant has called the “becoming-impasse,” 
or the “collaborative risk of a shared disorganization,” where “it 
is possible to value floundering around with others whose at-
tention-paying to what’s happening is generous and makes live-
ness possible as a good, not a threat” (2011, 85–86). But I still 
care about the fate of the public university, and that goes back 
to not wanting to blow things up. I just don’t know sometimes 
if the university is the place any more to work on the university.
Much of my own academic career (whatever that word “ca-
reer” might mean) has been torn between: (a) wanting to reform 
the university from within (where the glacial pace of change 
and seemingly endemic cowardice and personally petty antipa-
thies have mainly dispirited me), and (b) wanting to escape its 
techno-managerial-bureaucratic controls completely in order 
to found and enact something radically Other, something more 
faithful to Derrida’s “university without condition,” which Der-
rida believed would “remain an ultimate place of critical resis-
tance — and more than critical — to all the powers of dogmatic 
and unjust appropriation,” and which had special safekeeping 
by way of the humanities, entailing the “principal right to say 
everything, whether it be under the heading of fiction and the 
experimentation of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, 
to publish it” (2001, 26). Of course this is a utopian view, but I 
believe the university, in a sense, has always been utopian and 
never really actualized. We may bemoan the hyperbolic cor-
poratization of the University, where we hardly have time any 
more to simply read, think, write, and teach thanks to never-
ending rounds of assessment protocols, and where the defund-
ing of humanities programs continues apace with the adjunc-
tification of teaching lines and an obscenely staggering level of 
national student loan debt, but the University has always been, 
in some sense, a bureaucratic institution — its very “institution-
171
Unlearning
ality” and various modes and protocols of professionalization 
of disciplinary knowledge necessarily created (and sustains) a 
situation where, as Foucault once argued,
the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organized and redistributed according to a certain number of 
procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, 
to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome 
materiality. […] We all know perfectly well that we are not 
free to just say anything, that we cannot simply speak of any-
thing, when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, 
may speak of just anything. (1972, 216)
So perhaps the University-to-come is one of those chance 
(and precarious) events with which we must now cope (and 
also cultivate). Could we perhaps embrace a deterritorializa-
tion of the University, some sort of exodus that is not an es-
cape from obligation(s) because it is also intent on inventing a 
common world as “a space of horizontal negotiations without 
arbiter” (Bourriaud 2009, 188)? This might entail going “radi-
cant” — Nicolas Bourriaud’s term for “setting one’s roots in 
motion, staging them in heterogeneous contexts and formats, 
denying them the power to completely define one’s identity, 
translating ideas, transcoding images, transplanting behaviors, 
exchanging rather than imposing.” One has roots (a past, cer-
tain inheritances, etc.), but they are always on the move, “ef-
facing their origin(s) in favor of simultaneous or successive 
enrootings” (Bourriaud 2009, 22). This effacement could be 
painful, of course, even sad — yet nevertheless, roots remain, 
in place, while also being transitive. You can have your place, 
and move it, too. Same goes for the classroom, which could be 
anywhere, while still being rooted in what Bill Readings called 
the “university in ruins.” In other words, there is still a Univer-
sity (with a capital “U”) to which we are dedicated, but it isn’t 
the transnational corporation most of us work in today; rather, 
it is a collective commitment to spending time in “listening to 
Thought” — one which resists commodification and which al-
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ways keeps “meaning open as a locus of debate,” and there will 
never be a “homogeneous standard of value that might unite all 
poles of the pedagogical scene so as to produce a single scale of 
evaluation” of that situation (Readings 1996, 165).
Of course, as Aranye rightly points out, there are important 
issues of attachment to work through when considering where 
we might want to place ourselves vis-à-vis learning and teach-
ing, thinking and writing. But isn’t there also a productive sort 
of mourning always attendant upon learning, where one has to 
lose, or let go of (and then re-find in other spectral and mate-
rial forms) something practically every day? I used to always 
tell my students that they should want to know more, but they 
would also have to accept that knowing things entails being sad 
and embracing one’s fucked-up-ness, precisely because of that 
complexity Aranye describes — yes, complex systems always 
build on pre-existing materials, but something new is always 
emerging, and the ground is always moving under your feet. 
You couldn’t stand still, even if you wanted to. There are no cer-
tainties, no unchanging verities. Learning is already unlearning, 
a continual upending of everything you thought you knew, and 
therefore, difficult and melancholic, especially when it requires 
you to let go of something you thought you couldn’t live with-
out. And no one said we had to let go of everything. With Ste-
phen White, I believe in the “sustaining” affirmations of weak 
ontologies — “strong beliefs, weakly held.” Our “figurations of 
self, other, and beyond-human are never purely cognitive mat-
ters; rather they are always aesthetic–affective,” yet a weak ontol-
ogist recognizes that “no one set of figurations can claim univer-
sal, self-evident truth” (White 2005, 17). Commitments matter, 
figurations matter, but we must carry these life-goods lightly.
I agree that we have to also consider that “tear in the fabric 
of the Real” (whether climate change catastrophe or even just 
the “ruin” of the university as “public trust”) and whether or 
not, similar to that tribe for whom the Elders have been wiped 
out, there is “irreparable damage” to our “capacity for making 
and responsiveness,” or there is still “opportunity to innovate”? 
Another way to put this might be, “what do we hope for now” 
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(as learners, as teachers)? As Jonathan Lear explicates beauti-
fully in Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation, 
“as finite erotic creatures it is an essential part of our nature that 
we take risks just by being the world” and the world itself is not 
“merely the environment in which we move about”; rather, “it 
is that over which we lack omnipotent control,” and at any mo-
ment, it “may intrude upon us,” outstripping “the concepts with 
which we seek to understand it” (2006, 120). So, in merely think-
ing the world, we always take the risk “that the very concepts 
with which we think may become unintelligible” (Lear 2006, 
116). In such a scenario, learning might then be a form of radical 
hope — not hope as an affective (and ultimately insipid) orien-
tation toward definitive (projected-in-advance) outcomes, but 
rather, hope as a longing, or desire, for things that we do not 
fully, and cannot ever fully, understand. There would thus al-
ways be dialogic struggle as well (which could also be a form 
of friendship) — learning as the sort of encounter modeled by 
Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman in Sex, or the Unbearable, 
where dialogue “commits us to grappling with negativity, non-
sovereignty, and social relation not only as abstract concepts but 
also as the substance and condition of our responses — and our 
responsibilities — to each other” (Berlant and Edelman 2013, 
ix), and I would add, to the world more largely. And the uni-
versity-to-come would constitute a collective project for which 
there is no foreseeable future, but on behalf of which future, 
we can agree — while we continue to disagree about all sorts of 
things — that at least we care.
Infinitely Enmeshed
What if we spread out our ideas and knowledge and signifiers 
and everything else on a Deleuzo-Guattarian surface, such that 
nothing is either old or new, past or present? What would we 
want from such plenty? What would we lose by giving up tem-
porality, irreversibility, yearning, the affective categories of past, 
present, and future? I think maybe we would lose some of the 
richness and variety of our affective states and transformations. 
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For more than a century, analysts have been devoted to the 
“frame”: the combination of the office, regular appointments, 
and financial regulations that ideally create a “holding envi-
ronment” for the patient. I respect what this structure can ac-
complish for many patients, partly because it’s a structure that 
evokes the death drive. Further, most analysts today know that 
the world is “in” the office and the office is in the world, and that 
transmission and transference transform without appreciable 
limit. These are material facts and effects. Eco-psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy are now beginning to think more deliber-
ately about how awareness of our infinite enmeshment with 
all forms of matter should change clinical practice, and as I’m 
sure you know, are beginning to advocate for and practice psy-
chotherapy “outside” the office, in the forests, atop mountains, 
and by the beautiful sea. I welcome this probing of boundaries, 
these topological enactments. I do not myself anticipate ever 
practicing by hiking; my view is that if we care about the na-
ture-that-is-no-longer-Nature, it’s best we stay out of it. But the 
single most important thing for any creature to learn, through 
education or psychoanalysis, or being cared for, or being taken 
care of, is that it is a mortal creature, ever-changing, yet in its 
organic form subject to the limit of death, constitutively vulner-
able to affecting and being affected because of its aliveness. The 
joys of creatureliness — the sensory and other sensitivities that 
are also the source of our vulnerability — are equally important 
in re-situating ourselves in a post-Guattarian world. I am not 
opposed to going “outside”; there are many ways to go “outside” 
the clinic and the university, too. I just don’t want to go Outward 
Bound. The issue I want to address is how we now conceive 
phenomenologically of the topology of the relationships among 
classrooms, clinics, inner and outer worlds — especially because 
my interlocutor Eileen has been such a visionary creator of de-
institutionalizing processes and practices. 
The classroom is unquestionably an intersubjective, transper-
sonal space/event. What are its therapeutic possibilities, given 
that group therapy techniques are not appropriate in the none-
theless highly groupified scene of academic learning? One of my 
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former professors once said to me that asking students how they 
felt about a poem or whatever was an ipso facto admission of 
pedagogical incompetence. Given what we have learned about 
perceptions and affects in the intervening years, I am now sure 
he was wrong. In the humanities and fine arts, we can help our 
students think about what feelings are, how feelings work, what 
kinds of intelligence they represent, and why they are often so 
difficult either to communicate to, or hide from, other beings. 
At the same time, we help them “see,” “hear,” and “touch” — what 
do images evoke in us, what is the intonational range of a line of 
verse, and why, and where does a poem place us? Our topics and 
teaching methods can emphasize the integration of thinking and 
symbolizing with affect and sensation, and in this way, help us 
all learn about the learning process as we go. All facts and ideas 
have valence, both “positive” and “negative,” as the psycholo-
gists so lyrically put it. Learning ought to include awareness of 
this principle. If Texan students need to “unlearn” the idealized 
version of us history they are now taught in high school when 
they get to college or university, I believe this process must in-
clude mourning, helping them to understand that knowledge 
and knowledge production have valence, that we all become at-
tached to particular narratives, conceptualizations, and beliefs, 
and that we understand them better when we understand how 
and why we are attached to them. So we can ask students about 
the range of feelings inspired in them by specific concepts (and 
vice-versa), lived experience, and literary texts. We can help 
our students cultivate and enjoy the crucial real-time activities 
of interpretation and expression that make relationships — eco-
nomic, political, personal — possible in the first place. We can 
help them value error, failure, and surprise. And we can help 
them work through the ideas and attitudes that severely limit 
the potentiality and richness of their life experience.
We can introduce our students to the mind’s real-time efforts 
to know itself, the world, and the minds of others — to see that 
the mind’s waywardness is part and parcel of its plasticity, that 
our species has learned to talk about feelings as a way of mak-
ing enabling use of them, that the ambiguities of language are 
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precisely what give it its powers of connectivity, in the form of 
the “spreading activations” Norman Holland (2009) discusses 
in Literature and the Brain, earlier called by Freud “associational 
pathways.” We can say things like “think,” while pulling on our 
hair, to illustrate embodiment. We can show them how free as-
sociation can begin a new thinking process, and how imagining, 
loving, and hating are aspects of remembering. There’s nothing 
like the real time of live classroom experience for learning more 
about the everyday mental and emotional activities on which 
surviving and thriving depend. The best way to teach students 
about their minds is to ask them to use them in situations that 
demand improvisation and colloquy — that is to say, in everyday 
life — regardless of whether one is lecturing or teaching a small 
seminar. Affects belong in the classroom — again, I am speaking 
of the importance of integrating affect and cognition — as does 
the time required to reflect on them. Interpreting the minds of 
others is a precious survival skill many millions of years in the 
making, and its practice is (therefore) a source of joy. Intersub-
jectivity is necessary to, if not sufficient for, learning, and that is 
what makes live classtime experience so precious and difficult 
to simulate. The classroom is an ecology, but like all ecologies, 
infinitely enmeshed in many many others.
The Affinity of Thought
How we might conceive of the topology of the relationship be-
tween the classroom and the clinic, especially with the possible 
joys to be derived from encountering other minds (and I would 
add, other forms of sentience — human and nonhuman, wheth-
er embodied in real time, in the realm of the aesthetic, etc.), feels 
important to me, too. Both the classroom and the clinic are (or 
could be) critical sites for cultivating the arts and technē of the 
care of the self, for working on ourselves to “invent,” and not 
to “discover,” as Foucault once remarked, “improbable manners 
of being” and new “affective intensities” that might “yield […] 
relations not resembling those that are institutionalized” (1996, 
310). This has something to do as well with philosophy — in-
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creasingly, one of our most marginalized disciplines within the 
humanities — yet could anything be more essential to learning, 
and to the university, since philosophy, or critical theory, names 
the practice of what Bill Readings called “thought beside itself ” 
(1996, 192), or what Leo Bersani has described as a lifelong de-
votion to “intrinsically unending” discussions, or, “to put it not 
quite so dryly, to spiritually liquefying speech” (2008a, 87). This 
is “a special kind of talk unconstrained by consequences other 
than further talk,” a type of “conversation suspended in virtual-
ity” that, similar to the psychoanalytic relation, treats the un-
conscious “not as the determinant depth of being but, instead, 
as de-realized being, as never more than potential being” (Ber-
sani 2008b, 28). This “talk” also entails what Aranye has called 
elsewhere, a “shared attention” that is a “consequence of attach-
ment” and of “intersubjective play,” and which is always about 
“becoming” and never about “finishing” (Fradenburg 2011, 62, 
57). Both the classroom and the clinic, as well as the signifying 
arts, as Aranye has described them in various writings, invite an 
“affective companionship” in which “we never finish working 
things out,” but that doesn’t mean we don’t accomplish anything 
(Fradenburg 2011, 50). Such sites also require what Aranye has 
called “friendly” yet impersonal minds: “extimate” figures who 
enact a sort of “disinterested pastoral care” (healers, narrators, 
therapists, teachers), and who, in premodern narratives, were 
“always liminally situated — in homes not their own, woods and 
clearings, anonymous thropes, away from the main business of 
the day” (Fradenburg 2011, 59).
Away from the main business of the day — what, today, might 
it mean to live and practice pedagogic relations as forms of 
care of the self and affective (non-possessive) companionship 
in the liminal spaces so necessary for engendering productive 
encounters with other “friendly” minds, and with error, failure, 
and surprise? The university, I believe, has become increasingly 
hostile toward such liminal spaces, such encounters, and such 
non-calculable events, and it is increasingly insisting that ev-
erything, in fact, be “worked out,” and in a business-like fashion 
that feels very antithetical to the idea that knowledge should 
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remain perpetually unsettled (that “learning,” in fact, is always 
“unlearning”). I believe that the university, and its classrooms, 
will continue to be important sites for keeping open the ques-
tion of thought and for fostering various important modes of 
affectively-wired cognitive experiments, but I also think it is 
time for a subterfugitive, vagabond, rogue para-academy, espe-
cially when so many of us are hanging on to the university by 
the skin of our teeth (and minds). We might even distinguish 
between the University (as a certain institution of knowledge 
communication) and Academia (as knowledge communica-
tion itself), between which there is no necessary connection. As 
Paul Boshears has put it, “Both the University and Academia 
are imagined communities, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s 
phrase. However, the University is an institution that accredits, 
controls, and stamps the passport of those who would enter its 
territory. It is a striated space as opposed to Academia’s [more] 
fluid space” (quoted in Allen et al. 2012, 139). I don’t know if I 
myself completely buy into this distinction (I’ve always been of 
the camp that everything is so intermeshed that trying to draw 
lines is just futile), but I would like to see scholars absconding 
with the University (with, in other words, its academic “contra-
band”), in order to practice a polyglot, cosmopolitan pedagogy 
that would enunciate a “shaggy heart” and have “no fixed abode” 
(Kristeva 1994, 140). 
“Frames,” matter, of course, and as Aranye points out, the 
classroom (as well as the therapist’s office) serve as important 
“holding environments,” but if the mind’s “waywardness is 
part and parcel of its plasticity,” then can we not also engage a 
wandering pedagogy — not necessarily in the style of Outward 
Bound (I don’t like hauling canoes, or hiking, myself, either), 
but in terms of having the courage to either depart the existing 
institution in order to form new desiring-assemblages and new 
environments for our embodied pedagogies (however we might 
envision them) or to hunker down within the institution itself 
while also refusing to comply with the baroquely deadening “ef-
fectiveness” protocols and “cost-to-benefits” analyses dreamed 
up by the ever-increasing ranks of the university’s managerial 
179
Unlearning
technocrats? Perhaps teaching within the institution has always 
been, in some sense, adversarial and subversive with respect 
to the university’s administrators, if even quietly so (because 
under the radar, behind a closed door, largely undocumented, 
and in many respects, unremarked upon). And there is some-
thing importantly private and intimate (while also impersonal) 
about the pedagogic scene, no matter how publicly situated. I 
am reminded of something Lyotard wrote in 1978 about his ex-
perience teaching philosophy at Vincennes in a beautiful, yet 
somewhat despairing essay, “Endurance and the Profession.” At 
the time that Lyotard wrote this essay, the philosophy faculty 
had lost the right to grant degrees, and yet students were still 
showing up to study philosophy there. Christopher Fynsk has 
referred to Lyotard’s anguished reflections on his teaching at 
that time as a “pedagogy on the verge of disaster” (2013). Here 
is Lyotard:
The concessions to what you feel is expected become rarer. 
You’d like to neglect even what your own mind desires, make 
it accessible to thoughts it doesn’t expect. […] You are un-
faithful in your alliances like the barbarians of Clastres, but 
for a different reason, opposite at least. You’re at war with in-
stitutions of your own mind and your own identity. And you 
know that with all this, you’re probably only perpetuating 
Western philosophy, its laborious libertinage, and its oblig-
ing equanimity. At least you also know that the only chance 
(or mischance) to do so lies in setting philosophy beside it-
self. (1993, 75–76)
When I myself read these words, I experienced something of a 
shock as I recognized in the words “setting philosophy beside 
itself ” an echo with Bill Readings’s description of the Univer-
sity-to-come as the place where we simply place Thought be-
side itself — thoughts alongside other thoughts — without ever 
asserting the need for consensus (or even for departments that 
would ultimately sediment, and strangulate, Thought over time). 
Then I also noticed that Readings was the editor of Lyotard’s 
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collected political writings, in which “Endurance and the Pro-
fession” is included, and thus the “impress” of Lyotard’s writing 
upon Readings’s own writing also impressed itself upon my own 
consciousness with a certain tender vibration. 
And I trace this line of affinity of thought to also say, or claim, 
that the University-to-come must also be a place of the affinity 
of Thought, where Thought continually suspends itself in its en-
counters with Other Thought, by it which it is always limned 
and bordered. This affinity would, of necessity, be a difficult af-
finity, but it would still be affinity, a closeness and intimacy that 
is important, because chosen freely, between ourselves, whether 
inside of the classroom or outside of it. This would be a peda-
gogy of rogue desires (or thoughts) meeting, in the forest, with 
other rogue desires (or thoughts). Everything would be in sus-
pension, and in contact, simultaneously. Unworking thought, 
while also “working it,” would be our aim. It would always be 
dusk. The conversation would never end.
Going Outdoors
Yes, topological intricacy matters in the thinking of un/learning. 
Going “outdoors” to an outdoors that isn’t necessary concrete, 
but can be. Going “outdoors” not to learn that we can survive 
in Nature unassisted, but so that we can cultivate sentience, i.e., 
sense, feel, and enjoy our creatureliness. In the virtual extimacy 
of the mindscape, anything can happen, just as the extimacy of 
the outdoors is a realm of possibility. What is in me is also in 
whatever surrounds me, and vice-versa. Learning is what we do; 
therapeutic opportunities are everywhere. How might we best 
design, enrich, enable changes of embodied, environed minds? 
We have here, for example, a platform for newly creative think-
ing about how we might deliver “alternative” skills to graduate 
students who can’t or don’t choose to become professors, so 
that we might open the university to the kinds of learning and 
“working through” enabled by movement and making, enacting 
as well as acting. “Skills” or “arts and crafts” only sound boring 
because we have scorned for so long the materiality associated 
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with them, preferring the more putatively spiritual pursuits of 
theory. But action and movement, according to the philoso-
phers and neuroscientists, is looking less and less cognitively-
deprived and more and more like the very ground of cognition 
itself. If we can use theory to cultivate and maintain awareness 
of what is entailed in action and enactment, we will be able to 
frame psychoanalysis quite differently, and perhaps open up for 
ourselves the enjoyments entailed in all the kinds of work we do.
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